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MIRACULOUS FINANCIAL ENGINEERING  
OR TOXIC FINANCE? THE GENESIS  
OF THE U.S. SUBPRIME MORTGAGE LOANS CRISIS 
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ON THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND REAL ECONOMY 
In the fall of 2008, the U.S. subprime mortgage loans defaults have turned into 
Wall Street’s biggest crisis since the Great Depression. As hundreds of billions in 
mortgage-related investments went bad, banks became suspicious of one another’s 
potential undisclosed credit losses and preferred to reduce their exposure in the 
interbank markets, thus causing interbank interest rates and credit default swaps 
increases, a liquidity shortage problem and a worsened credit crunch condition to 
consumers and businesses. Massive cash injections into money markets and interest 
rates reductions have been assured by central banks in an attempt to shore up banks 
and to restore confidence within the financial system. Even Governments have 
promoted bail-out deal agreements, protections from bankruptcies, recapitalizations and 
bank nationalizations in order to rescue banks from disastrous bankruptcies. 
The credit crisis originated in the previous years when the Federal Reserve 
sharply lowered interest rates (Fed Funds at 1 %) to limit the economic damage of the 
stock market decline due to the 2000 dot.com companies’ crisis. Lower interest rates 
made mortgage payments cheaper, and the demand for homes began to rise, sending 
prices up. In addition, millions of homeowners took advantage of the rate drop to 
refinance their existing mortgages. As the industry ramped up, the quality of the 
mortgages went down due to poor credit origination and credit risk assessment. 
Delinquency and default rates began to rise in 2006 as interest rates rose (Fed Funds 
at 5,25 %) and poor households across the US struggled to pay off their mortgages. 
Many of them went bankrupt and lost their homes but the pace of lending did not 
slow. 
Banks have transformed much of the high-risk mortgage debt (securitizations) 
into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO), 
and have sold these assets on the financial markets to investment firms, hedge funds, 
and insurance companies around the world, transferring to these investors the rights 
to the mortgage payments and the related credit risk. With the collapse of the first 
banks and hedge funds in 2007 the rising number of foreclosures helped speed the fall 
of housing prices, and the number of prime mortgages in default began to increase. 
As many CDO products were held on a “mark to market” basis, the paralysis in the 
credit markets and the collapse of liquidity in these products let to the dramatic 
write-downs in 2007. When stock markets in the United States, Europe and Asia 
continued to plunge, leading central banks took the drastic step of a coordinated cut in 
interest rates and Governments coordinated actions that included taking equity 
stakes in major banks. 
This paper aims to demonstrate, through solid and fact-based assumptions, that 
this global financial crisis could have been addressed and managed earlier and better 
by many of the stakeholders involved in the subprime mortgage lending process 
such as, banks’ and investment funds management, rating agencies, banking and 
financial markets supervisory authorities. The paper somehow “prophetically” 
anticipated also the potential threat of a Eurozone crisis, as a consequence of the 
2007–2009 crisis. It reported that a number of European countries with slow GDP 
growth rates, high level of sovereign debt and/or budget deficits, and structural 
economic and social problems, would certainly have a very hard time coping with 
the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The underlying assumption being that, due 
to the global economic slowdown in international trade and consumptions, any 
form of massive government bailout of financial institutions or prolonged intervention 
to support economy growth and to avoid recession, through the use of automatic 
stabilizers, would have resulted in a totally unbearable and systemically risky situation 
for the entire Eurozone. Without appropriate and timely structural reforms, and 
coordinated pan-European policies/reforms (monetary, fiscal, and banking/financial 
markets) the private debt risk of the financial sector would be transferred to the public 
sector, thus generating the sovereign debt crisis and its potential spillover to other 
economies. 
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